Shine《光能》杂志2011年12月刊封面报道:施正荣——不妥协的老大
在这篇文章的开头,我要申明一点,这也许是第一次没有将注意力集中在一家的竞争力而是放在了领导人身上,这并非是一篇倾向性的报道,而实在是施正荣所代表的,已经超出了尚德本身。
相信很多人知道“光伏”这个词是因为施正荣,从对2005年中国首富的关注,到对这个行业的好奇,再到投身于这个行业,6年的时间,无数的资本和怀揣梦想的淘金者跨入这个行业,潮起潮落间,施正荣一直站在风口浪尖。
很多人和与笔者一样,都是从其它兄弟行业转入光伏。记得在2006年初,中国政府从“资源换美元”中如梦初醒,开始打压污染耗能行业,笔者所从事金属硅行业也由于上不起环保的小众多,行业陷入停滞状态,那时一吨加工粗糙的金属硅售价1000美元(当时美元汇率大概是8.3),只能赚300-500元人民币。为了让读者更方便理解这个利润率的概念,笔者举个例子:经常有在接到订单后出货时,发现海运费或是汇率稍微浮动一点,最后利润为零甚至是负数,所以笔者在08年看到不计成本的一批批空运时才会瞠目结舌。
淘汰高污染高耗能的行业是大势所趋,因此笔者在当时也寻求个人的职业转型,这时尚德已经在西方一片狂欢声中上市, 施也在圣诞节前后以186亿的资产成为中国首富。但他真正被国人熟知却是在2006年初,在签约鸟巢后,媒体给予了更多的关注。笔者也是在这个时候看到了每公斤1美元的金属硅卖到国外提纯为多晶硅后,以100美元的被国人买回来,在被刺痛的同时也看到了关于尚德和施正荣的相关报道,当然,那时谁也不会想到在08年三季度,多晶硅的现货已经涨到了近500美元/公斤。
耀眼的布道者
那个时候,大众媒体总是喜欢追朔施的身世,大家也乐于看到一个草根英雄的崛起,所以少时穷困,青年留学,不惑创业的施正荣成为“知识改变命运”的代表,典型的海归英雄。
可以说,中国光伏能有现在的局面,施正荣功不可没,业内至少70%的是跟着尚德的足迹踩进了这个行业。如果觉得这个数字夸张,那么去数一下现在中国的光伏有多少是在2005年后成立或者开始涉足光伏领域的就知道了。
第一次见到施正荣,是在上海的第二届SNEC展会上,尚德给这家展览公司提供了很大支持。开幕仪式结束后,施和几位光伏届的专家被众星拱月般的媒体团团围住,那时的施正荣给人的感觉是锋芒毕露,光彩照人,这是尚德最强盛的时刻。此时强如英利、天合,在尚德和施正荣的强大气场下,也只是红花边上的一朵绿叶。
招风的大树
施正荣一直以行业老大自诩,从言谈上给人的感觉也是舍我其谁的感觉,对于中国光伏业,他确实做了很多,包括但不限于尚德的成功模式带动的中国投资狂潮。
SolarWorld和美国钢铁工人协会发动了各种反倾销,尤其是SolarWorld,从德国追到美国,对此施正荣在2009年赴欧希冀解决争端,在美国“301”法案推出时也四处呼吁。
中国人好大喜功的恶习被美国人当真了,光伏获得的银行授信被中国有意无意、国外别有用心的当做贷款来看,美方将这点在新一轮的反倾销调查中夸大其词。对于这些控诉,施正荣表示“光伏产业需要一个统一的机制,也包括贸易争议的解决机制。”
实际上尚德是唯一一个有机会让中国光伏行业出现统一声音的,从施正荣的言谈中也可以透露出他也致力于同行之间的互相合作,但时至今日,中国光伏仍然如沙雕的城堡一般,看似庞大壮丽,实则不堪一击。虽不能责怪尚德的不作为,但终究让人扼腕。究其原因,在于施正荣的性格所致,但我们细细分析,却又不能将问题归结到施正荣和尚德的头上。
笔者曾将光伏行业形容为一桌麻将,政府、国企、大和小的四方博弈,在这个赌桌上,国企的赌资是由政府提供的,而政府和大又暗通款曲,所以小处于孤立无援的状态,这也是国内普遍存在的现象。从乳制品行业强制上就可以看出,最后倒下的反而是那些没出过什么问题的小。
同时几乎所有的、标准都是向着大倾斜的,所以小很少愿意参与协会等行业机构,所以在中国开会,上面坐着的永远是那几家大的负责人或高管。因此在今年德国汉堡和美国达拉斯展上,一家小接连爆出“1美元/瓦”和“0.89美元/瓦”的超低价,笔者在观察后,发现该展位几乎无人问津,但却被整体拉低了。
我们回头看看国内大厂,如果大厂间能够达成协作共赢的模式,中国光伏的发展也会顺利许多,毕竟如果能够多赚些,没人愿意背负“低价倾销”的恶名。但尚德在此却没能成功的收服各路诸侯,换言之,现在的尚德,只不过是拳头最大罢了。这是为什么?
逐鹿的鹿
如果把光伏竞争比作群雄逐鹿,那么尚德则扮演着双重角色,既是最大的诸侯,偶尔也客串下“鹿”的角色。这样的关系,让尚德与同行间的关系一度紧张。
在尚德上市后,尚德积累了数年的人员在新晋厂商中无疑是一座座移动着的人型金矿,但以尚德一家是无法将这些金矿全部挖掘并打造成首饰的,因此一段时期内,无论是尚德的员工还是管理层都成了猎头公司的目标。
与经常与尚德相提并论的英利不同,英利地处北方,处于一家独大的状态,附近并无同级别竞争对手,许多员工在安家后就不愿去外地工作,而且北方人的恋家情结也较为严重;尚德所在的江苏省则群雄并起,员工去其它单位工作很方便,同时南方人更愿意为赚钱多付出努力。更重要的是,英利走的是贴近国企模式的路线,这样给中国人更多的归属感;尚德在这方面则是力图打造国际化的团队,更好的适应光伏行业高度国际化的特点,但这也让员工流动性也高度“国际化”。一个很好的例子可以证明这点:英利在金融危机和现在的低谷时,都喊出了“不降薪,不裁员”的口号,而尚德则变相裁员来化解危机。
这些年陆续从尚德被其它挖走或离职的高管有:
杨怀进,与施同样从澳洲留学,并与其回国创业,后陆续于南京中电(中电光伏前身)、晶澳太阳能任职,后任海润光伏CEO,帮助海润成功上市。
张凤鸣、泰德,施正荣在澳洲的同事,陆续离职后与杨怀进一起进入中电光伏,与赵建华夫妇共事,张凤鸣现任天威首席官,泰德在台创立旭泓全球光电。
王汉飞,尚德第一名职业经理人,当时尚德科研人员齐备,政府关系由无锡政府给予支持,前董事长李延人出面打理,王汉飞作为施正荣的助手,做了大量工作。后受林洋(韩华新能源前身)老板陆永华邀请,2004年年中离开尚德,助林洋在美国纳斯达克上市。可惜由于积劳成疾,2008年7月在睡梦中英年早逝。他的去世让陆永华悲痛万分,在光伏行业的心气也低了许多,后低调分两次转让全部股权。
邵华千,从创业初期的施正荣秘书做到副总裁,她的离去让施正荣颇为惋惜。
陈立志,于尚德工作5年,后出任尚德美国公司副总裁,负责美洲业务拓展,在今年7月闪电离职。
张怡,尚德CFO,于今年离职。
至于中层和一线操作工人,流失情况更为严重,这也造成了尚德与各家间的矛盾虽未摆在明面上,但却一直存在。
正如一个硬币的两面,尚德员工离职也并非全部来自外部的招揽。
施正荣与天合CEO高纪凡同样推崇走国际化路线,他们会经常强调尚德或天合都不只是一个中国公司,而应该看作一个国际化的公司(而事实也确实如此,上市的中国光伏中,中国人的股权只占一小部分,而施又要算是澳籍)。他们都醉心于打造一个国际化的团队,所以在天合和尚德随处可见外籍员工担任管理和对外事务的工作。
施正荣、高纪凡等人为中国光伏业每一次实施和调整功不可没,而且成功的让中国政府重视光伏行业对于节能减排的意义,中国光伏发展计划从无到有,直至现在的2020年50GW的发展目标,他们一次次的游说,并邀请政府官员到厂参观,证明光伏是清洁的、能够帮助中国进行产业转型的新兴产业。中国的光伏行业到今年能够启动,施和高可以说是最大功臣。
但尚德和天合对于国内的态度都可以归纳为“关注但不投入”,两家对中国的关注度与国外相差甚远,对于方面,两家均倾向于走上层路线:与政府打好关系,等利好出台时自然分到一杯羹。
但如果要进一步打开国际,施正荣需要更加国际化的团队。在路透社网站公布的尚德高管列表中,首席财务官David来自美国博克德(BECHTEL)公司,上一份工作是在Tetra tech公司;John Lefebvre于9月26日任美国公司总裁,曾在SolarCity和GE工作;Andrew Beebe,首席商务官,毕业于美国最知名常青藤大学之一——达特茅斯。其余各位高管除谢晓南拥有无锡政府背景外,也均来自国际知名公司和新南威尔士大学。
大批的空降部队带来了让尚德在国际畅通无阻,但也带来新的问题:如何在老员工和“空降兵”之间一碗水端平?施正荣曾说:“我能用中国人肯定用中国人,但尚德面对的是欧美的客户,又不是中国的煤矿区。”但他在一心憧憬着将尚德国际化之时,却似乎忽略了这些“煤矿工人”掌握着尚德的科研、财务、客户和政府关系等方方面面。当了解中国,懂得中国管理模式的“煤矿工人”离职后,尚德的制度、理念传达很容易在中间层形成真空地带。有件事情是可以参考的,尚德今年颁发给实验室经理刘怀林100万元大奖,说明施正荣对科技进步的重视,但里面有个细节:刘怀林为了保证公司产品安全,把房子抵押给银行获得80万元的贷款,之后研发工作才得以进行。以施正荣对研发工作的专注,刘怀林为何不向上申报科研经费?
而且“空投部队”之前是“空军”,现在成为“陆军”后如何把心态调整过来,对尚德是否有那么深厚的感情都是未知数,之前尚德2006-2007年间高薪聘请的来自BP、西门子、普华永道等的中高层员工已经离职过半。
这其中体现了施正荣矛盾的心态,一方面,他希望尚德能够永远保持那种爆发式的增长,另一方面也希望老员工能够跟上他的国际化进程,但即使是施正荣本人,在管理上面也会犯错误,这个问题不是尚德独有,而是行业发展得过快,从几十MW的小厂到中国首富,再到金融危机和2010年的爆发,加上大家都想到会出现但没想到这么严重的行业低谷,光伏行业的陷阱和机遇一样多。专业分析机构Solarbuzz的高级分析师廉锐博士也说:“这个行业的不确定性太大,所以也请大家对我们预测的偏差给予理解。”施正荣也意识到这个问题,对媒体称在物色一个CEO,但这谈何容易?
不妥协的老大
施正荣的“老大”情结是业内公认的,当然,这一路走来,也只有尚德具备这个资格称为老大。但他却没能成为教父这样的角色,而更像是教父性格火爆、热爱家庭的长子桑尼。
在尚德上市的艰难过程中,国企背景过重是在美上市的一大阻碍,施正荣为此不惜与前董事长李延人矛盾激化,最后在无锡政府的帮助下,让小天鹅等原始股东退出,李延人黯然离职,这使无锡工商界对施正荣颇多微词。虽然不是当事人,无意对此做出评价,但冷静下来想想,不如此,尚德还能够成为现在的尚德么?
在行业快速发展时,施正荣警告行业会出现过剩,大多数人认为这是其想吓退竞争对手而无人领情;在英利爆出“6毛9”的超低价时,他数次在近千人的上嘲讽此事,虽然这件事的是非功过很难评说,而且据了解这是英利给国投电力的,是否国电报错也有待证实,但以施的身份,这些言辞只是折了他的气度。
从这几年的观察,施正荣的性格可以总结为:一个直率而有些莽撞、不妥协的理想主义者。
正是这样的性格,也让施正荣虽然一直在呼吁行业自律,但却应者寥寥。他自己也承认:”我们一定要避免一种观念:把对手整死我才能活好。这种想法很幼稚,你不可能把别人整死。现在,这个行业不断有新进入者进来,我的建议是:要理性地分析产业发展趋势和自己的竞争优势。“本应作为行业仲裁者的尚德,却经常在看到不满的事情后就拿起武器冲在最前面,这让他四处树敌。
业内流传着这样的一个事情:施正荣曾有意当选某新能源协会会长一职,但由于有人称其是澳籍,不符合规定,最后受阻。
施正荣也被看成是业内最著名的毒舌之一,原因在于:他经常会说些包括悲观预期和对业内一些现象的批评,他自称会经常发表些不成熟的预言。但不幸的是,这些年的历史证明,他大部分的话是对的。
“光伏行业存在泡沫,一个是财富效应,第二是地方政府推波助澜。”2007年提出,无人相信。
“没有,怎么有工厂!”质疑地方政府争相将光伏业列为重点产业。
“太阳能绝对是泡沫,要分析都是谁在炒概念?这里面有行业领袖和行业专家吗?”2009年施正荣评时惹众厂家怒。
“不论什么行业,只要中国人进入,立马上去。不注重品牌和商业模式建设,最后只能‘国人喝汤,洋人吃肉’。”2009年的预测,到现在可以说要实现了,现在乃至未来,上游环节都将维持在极低的利润率。
“欧洲需求下降,明年全球光伏将肯定出现过剩。”发布于2010年11月。
“光伏产业还未成形,今天的世界第几,明天可能什么都不是。”
“明后两年将会比较难过”,我们必须熬过这两年冬天。”—— 他预计明年太阳能板的库存水平将高达11GW。
他同样有很多能引起业内共鸣的语言。比如“大胆”预测今年中国将有1.5GW的容量,但他也说没想到竟然达到了3个GW;预测达到一块钱一度,现在已经成为现实。尚未得到验证的是他说2015年中国肯定是全球最大,年容量8GW-10GW,美国6个GW左右,中、美、印将成为最大的光伏。
他会说些大家都在说的如何度过行业危机,避免恶意竞争、建立行业制度等,他更会说些大家不会说的,如对于之前国内进展缓慢的失望,一些官员和政府部门的不作为,这相比一些四平八稳的老总,他实在是个异数。
作为一个媒体人,一个旁观者,尚德前几年中国的品牌营销可以说不甚成功,对于施的过度神话让人反感,觉得不切实际,相比商业奇才,我更愿把施正荣看成一个科技致富的英雄,一个为环保、为发展太阳能不遗余力的带理想主义色彩和以行业发展为己任的商人(他在对大众传播光伏应用上,可以说做了极大贡献),他自己也承认,会迷惑,会犯错误,何苦将其包装成一个完人?
在英利赞助世界杯后,同样赞助过珠峰等体育运动的尚德对其表示不看好。更有甚者,某位写手将英利的“英雄的胜利”解释为“蝇头小利”,让人哑然,虽然这应该不是出自施正荣的意愿,但进一步败坏了尚德的形象,这点英利做的比较含蓄,只是在反击的文章中让读者自行比较优劣,之所以这么说的原因在于那些文章中施正荣的信息很容易搜集,但能够获得一向低调的英利CEO苗连生如此详细的信息,非内部人员不可。
这种情况在施任命张建敏为媒体关系经理后大为改善,现在的尚德,以一种更为宽厚的目光来看待同业间的事件、摩擦,也为尚德赢得了更多的尊重。
直面错误
在9月底举行的尚德十周年庆典上,一向精神抖擞的施正荣却显得有些疲惫,结构调整,战略布局和很多的负面消息让他休息不够。他说:“过去十年我们有很多光环,有很多辉煌,因为我们是老大,我们也付出了很多老大的代价,我们也做了很多探索,在探索有成功也有失败,为后来者、为第二、第三位提供了很多可借鉴的经验。在此同时我们也受到很多质疑,你做老大就要做到很好,我们有时候也不一定能做好很好,所以媒体的朋友对我宽容一点。”这为他赢得了热烈的掌声,因为这在以前,是不曾有过的。给笔者的感觉是他终于从神化的光环中走出来,多了些反思和总结。虽然他的演讲仍然屡次强调尚德的领导地位,但却让人会心一笑而不反感,不如此,他就不是施正荣了。
虽然施正荣承认犯过一些错误,但有些错误笔者认为并不能归咎于他,之前沸沸扬扬的“诈捐”事件冷静分析下,尚德的操作手法是否正确虽然存疑,但商人的投入总是要回报的,在做好事的同时追求利益最大化无可厚非。
同样让尚德显得有些狼狈的与MEMC终止合约一事,也是非战之罪。除天合CEO高纪凡在2008上半年有所警觉而壮士断腕,弃已投资千万的多晶硅之外,行业内几乎无人嗅到金融危机的风险。包括Q-cells、CSI和南京中电等,也都与多晶硅签订了长单。此次解除供应,让尚德从长远角度看,摆脱了身上的枷锁,当年MEMC在签订十年供货协议时,还顺带要了尚德的股份,这次双方“分手”,一方面应该是MEMC不肯议价,另一方面是尚德有意涉足环节以进一步降低成本。”2006年我们与它签合同的时候,原材料的比便宜20%-30%,但后来我们看到原材料的趋势在往下走,如果我们把这份合同执行下去,要比现货价亏损4个多亿美金。于是我们与MEMC公司商量停止执行合同,我们给它一些补偿。由于我们5年前已经预付款5700万美金,对方同意我们再付6000多万美金就结束合同。总计我们要付出1.1亿美金,但可以节省4亿美金。“
今年3月,尚德电力以1.3亿美元的高价,收购了制造荣德新能源。荣德新能源前身为辉煌硅能源(也是尚德电力的供应商)。根据尚德的公司规划,荣德新能源计划总投资10亿美元,在2011年上半年形成单晶硅和多晶硅总计1.23G W的,到2011年的年尾要达到2.4GW,切片达到1.2GW,也可以这样说,自产切片一直都保持在一半的供应产量上。荣德新能源最终将形成3GW的数量。
个人认为施的真正错误在于投资。在唱衰短期前景后,施正荣又忍不住上,这可以归结为他对的感情:做了一辈子,总想做点突破,而且做惯老大的尚德也难以忍受在可能成为未来主流的上落后。
从2007年5月到2011年初,浪费了大量的时间和财力,该最终被放弃。做为一个一直从事研究,至今喜欢被人称作施博士的科学家和一个成功的商人,如果说分析不出该的可行性是令人难以置信的。比较有说服力的是这个理想主义者仍然对老本行念念不忘,即使存在风险,他也要去冒险赌一赌。“我是个理想主义者,今年已年过半百,还有理想。”施正荣说做为一个探索者,尚德还会保持这种敢于犯错的勇气,给后来者避免犯错,避免曲折的机会。
“中国还是要花更多时间,并且实实在在地把销售收入中的5%或者8%放在研发上,那么5年以后中国再出现一个被认可的First Solar是可能的。”可惜,现在的光伏生存压力过大,留给研发的空间越来越小了,像First Solar那样埋头研究10年后一鸣惊人的情况已不可复制。
媒体经常拿施正荣和英利的CEO苗连生做比较,反差极大的两人代表着中外思潮的碰撞。在平稳渡过金融危机、提前预知并应对寒冬这些方面,苗连生比施正荣强的太多。施正荣说最艰难的时候是创业初期员工纷纷离开,债主上门讨债的,他觉得非常的窝囊和受人欺负。但苗从军退伍后从事过六七种行业,二十余年的摸爬滚打,起起伏伏让他对于风险和本质的认识在行业内不做第二人选,那些从苗连生创业就跟随左右,已经身居高位的英利高管中,很多人仍然不吃胡萝卜,就是因为在十几年前英利公司还在卖菜时,连续几个月用胡萝卜抵一部分的工资。相比起来,施正荣的创业环境,实在可以用“天堂”形容。科技英雄、上市公司、中国首富等各种光环在很短时间接踵而来,作为一个正常人,施正荣需要时间去消化和沉淀。
目前舆论和利润状况都较好的英利实际上也有自己的难题,之前引以为傲的垂直整合模式被行业普遍采用,“熊猫计划”的成本也偏高,六九硅业由于多晶硅急速下滑而处境尴尬,苗连生的忧患意识让英利几乎总能避免大的受损,不至伤筋动骨。
与尚德的模式更为相像的是天合光能,高纪凡和施正荣都是推崇打造国际化的公司,都对别人称其为中国公司感到不满,但天合的运营几乎没有出过大的失误,而且成本控制也比较好,这证明了国际化路线在中国是行得通的。高纪凡的谨慎和对成本的把控是主要原因。
施正荣的战略眼光并不只给尚德带来空中楼阁般的声名,还有实实在在的好处,当时施正荣力排众议成立的GSF(Global Sola Fund)为尚德在2010年一季度就获得投资盈利超2亿美元。
而作为一个毛泽东式的理想主义者,对施正荣功过是非的争议要比业内任何家多得多,如毛一般,他开创了一个时代,让光伏行业得以蓬勃发展,也让李源潮等目前在中央身居要职的国家领导认识到光伏行业,有望结束光伏“朝中无人”的局面;如毛一般,他在后续建设发展中务实精神不足,将精力放眼于天下而缺乏细节;现在他也如毛一般走下了神坛,这种转变实际上对他和尚德来说是件好事情。
无责任猜想:尚德会被收购么?
本月韩国LG与尚德同时发表声明,否认之前风传的LG将收购尚德一事。实际上在2009年就有大量的报道传言尚德将被收购,后来这些都被事实打败,现在的施正荣在回应包括尚德破产在内的这些传言时显得更加淡定。
我们来无责任猜想一下,如果尚德被收购,那么将是哪几家?收购尚德,首先要具备行业基础和对行业的了解,范围可以锁定圈内;其次收购尚德能够协助其降低成本,提高科技创新,所以最有可能的就是多晶硅,收购尚德后一个强有力的产业链打造完善,届时的尚德将更加可怕。
满足这两个条件的有诸如协鑫、OCI、REC、Hemlock和Wacker等。但Hemlock和Wacker似乎满足于在光伏行业的现状,因此前三个的可能性最大。当然,笔者认为施正荣是不会将自己的心血出售的,这个行业的大中,真正功成身退的只有因王汉飞去世心灰意冷的林洋老板陆咏华,其它人又怎么舍得放手一手打造起来的数百亿的产业和更诱人的前景。
也有传言,尚德目前的负面消息被有意扩大,也是有意收购尚德的买家刻意炒作,但事实究竟如何,尚不得而知。
买点?
中国能源所所长李俊峰在尚德十周年的会上开玩笑说:“建议大家买点尚德的,因为目前包括尚德在内的光伏股价已经跌至低谷,仅和厂房价值就远超现在的市值。”李俊峰还没有提及尚德的品牌和渠道建设,这个价值则更不容忽视,即使目前的尚德一瓦的都没有,仅找OEM代工就完全可以做得风生水起。
相信很多投资者都对包括尚德在内的几家光伏大厂的颇为心动,因为从长远角度看,这些大厂在未来的竞争中不存在存活下去的问题,而只要有能力活下去,就同样有能力迎来这个行业的大发展,这是我们全体光伏人都从不怀疑的事情。只不过现在大家希望尽可能的抄底罢了。
白手起家,上市、扩张,再到经历行业的起起伏伏,现在尚德年2.4GW,每天的生产量6MW,相当于2003年全年的产量,无论今后的尚德之路怎样,施正荣和他的尚德已然成为一段传奇。
版权申明:施正荣——不妥协的老大,系天晟国际传媒有限公司旗下Shine《光能》杂志版权所有并授权发表。
Shi Zhengrong— Uncompromising Leader
At the beginning, I must state in advance that I am not writing a tendentious article on purpose. Maybe this is the first time that my focus is not on a company’s competiveness but on a company leader. But, the truth is that what Shi Zhengrong stands for is far more than just Suntech.
I think many people, just like me, know PV because of Shi Zhengrong. From attention to China wealthiest person in 2005 to curiosity to PV industry and finally a member in PV industry, in this 6 years, many investors and gold digger rushed into it, ups and downs, but Shi Zhengrong have been in the teeth of storm.
Lots of people and companies in PV industry now are new entrant like me. I remember that China woke up in the dream “energy for dollar” in 2006 and began to strike at enterprises with high energy co
nsumption and pollution. The silicon industry, in which I was engaged, came to a standstill because of lack of mo
ney to pay for enviro
nment protection equipments. Then, 1 tons of Silicon produced roughly sold 1,000 dollars (then the foreign exchange of USD to RMB is a
bout 8.3), and profit was o
nly 300-500 yuan. I cited a sample for you to understand better here: many companies found they had no profit or made a loss after shipment if shipping cost or foreign exchange changed a little. So I was very surprised at the situation that companies shipped the PV modules by air without co
nsidering the cost in 2008.
Elimination of high pollution and high energy-co
nsuming industries is the trend. I was also seeking my career transition then. Suntech went public in west Christmas carnival, and Shi Zhengrong became the wealthiest person with 18.6 billion yuan in China. He was familiar with people in the early 2006. After he signed the Bird Nest project in Beijing, media paid more attention to him. I saw that the silicon, 1 dollar/kg in China, was sold to overseas and purified to polysilicon, then we bought back at the price of 100 dollars/kg. This shocked and also hurt me, and meanwhile I saw more reports a
bout Shi Zhengrong and Suntech. Of course, nobody knew polysilicon spot price would rise to nearly 500 dollars/kg in Q3, 2008.
Dazzling Preacher
At that time, public medium always are interested in Shi Zhengrong’s growing process. People are glad to see the success of grassroots. So, Shi Zhengrong, who was poor as a child, studied abroad in youth and established a business in forty, represented the “knowledge changes destiny” and became a typical overseas returnee hero with technology.
Shi Zhengrong made great co
ntribution for China PV industry’s situation currently. At least 70% PV companies followed Suntech and entered into the PV industry. If you think it’s too overstated, you can just count the number of companies that were established or did PV business after 2005.
On the second SNEC, I saw Shi Zhengrong for the first time. Suntech gave great support to it. After the opening ceremony, Shi Zhengrong and several PV specialists were surrounded by lots of media. Then, Shi Zhengrong showed his ability to full extent and Suntech was powerful and prosperous. Even some strong players like Yingli and Trina Solar o
nly is green leaves that set off red flowers.
Destruction Pursues the Great
Shi Zhengrong has always praised himself as big brother in PV industry, and the way he spoke and said seemingly means “If I can't do it, who can?”. For China PV industry, he really co
ntributed too much, which included but more than China’s investment ecstasy simulated by Suntech’s success.
SolarWorld and the United Steelworders launched a variety of anti-dumping activities, especially SolarWorld. Shi Zhengrong went to Europe in 2009, hoping to resolve disputes, and also called for help when United States released 301 Bill.
Chinese always crave for greatness and success. PV companies’ bank credit was co
nsidered as bank loan by China companies intentio
nally and by United States’ companies unintentionally, and United States exaggerated this point in the new anti-dumping investigations. For these complaints, Shi Zhengrong said:”PV industry needs a united market mechanism, including trade dispute settlement mechanism.”
In fact, Suntech is the o
nly company that has a chance to unify the whole China PV industry. The remarks of Shi Zhengrong also revealed that he was committed to cooperate with each other in PV industry. But until now, China P V industry still looks like a castle of sand sculpture, spectacular but vulnerable. Although we cannot blame Suntech, it is a pity after all. The reason is Shi’s character. But if we look more closely, the problem cannot be attributed to Shi and Suntech.
o
nce I described the PV players as mahjong players, including government, state-owned enterprises, large enterprises and small businesses. In this game, state-owned enterprises’ gambling mo
ney is provided by the government and government and large enterprises always send secret messages, so small businesses are in the isolated state, which is a common phenomenon in China. For example, dairy industry was forced to equipment with testing devices, and small companies that never had problem with dairy felled finally.
While almost all of the policies and standards are inclined to large enterprises, so few small businesses are willing to participate in industry associations. In association meeting in China, they were always leaders of several large enterprises that sited on the platform. In EUPVSEC in Hamburg, Germany and SPI in Dallas, USA, a small company showed the surprising low price-$1 and $0.89.However, I found nobody was interested in it, and the overall market price was pulled down.
If PV competition is compared to hunters chasing for deer, Suntech plays a dual role—the most powerful hunter and occasio
nal deer, which o
nce strained the relatio
nship between Suntech and other players.
Deer Hunting Deer
Let us look back at the domestic large manufactures. If they can achieve win-win cooperation, China PV industry’s development will be more successful. After all, nobody is willing to bear the notoriety of “dumping” if he can make more money. However, Suntech failed to rein the powerful players. In other words, the current Suntech is nothing but the biggest fist. Why is it?
After Suntech was listed, a number of technical staff accumulated by Suntech became undoubtedly a gold mine of technician for new PV companies, but o
nly Suntech was not enough to develop the whole gold mine and make them all jewelry. So in a period of time, no matter Suntech’s staff or management officers became the target of headhunter companies.
Yingli, which often compared with Suntech, is different, it is located in the north, in a single big state, and with the level near without competition, many employees reluctance to go abroad to work after they settle down, and the people of the north is relatively complex long for family serious; Jiangsu Province, wher
e Suntech located is prosperous, and the staff is very co
nvenient to other units to work, while southerners are more willing to make mo
ney with more effort. More im
portance is that Yingli is close to the route of state-owned enterprises model, so that gives the Chinese more sense of belonging; Suntech in this respect is tries hard to make internatio
nal team, better adapt to the characteristics of the high degree of internatio
nalization photovoltaic industry, but it also let employees liquidity also highly "internationalization". A good example to prove that: At the time of the financial crisis and the now in the market when trough, Yingli Shouted "don't payout, no job cuts" slogan, and Suntech is downsizing in disguised form to defuse the crisis.
The executives left or taken by other enterprises from Suntech in these years:
Yang Huaijin, also studied abroad in Australia with Shi and venture together home, later succession took office in Nanjing CLP(the predecessor of China Sunergy),JA Solar,and later appointed as CEO of Hareon Solar, helping Hareon Solar to enter the market successfully.
Zhang Fengming, Ted, the colleagues of Shi in Australia, have left and get into China Sunergy with Yang Huaijin ,working with Zhao Jianhua couple, Zhang Fengming current is the CTO of Tianwei group, and Ted founded Sunrise Global Solar Energy in Taiwan.
Wang Hanfei, Suntech's first professio
nal manager, then Suntech scientific research perso
nnel ready, government relations by Wuxi government support ,former chairman of LiYanRen to do, Wang Hanfei as Shi's assistant, do a lot of work. He invited by Liu Yo
nghua later, the boss of Solarfun (predecessor of HSOL), left Suntech in the middle of 2004, helped Linyang go public nasdaq in the United States. But he fall sick from overwork and die in July 2008 in his sleep. His death made Lu Yo
nghua grieved, his mind in the photovoltaic industry is also lower than before, later he transferred all equity twice at low profile.
Shao Huaqian, was secretary of Shi when startup, and do as vice President later, her left making shi rather felt sorry.
Chen Lizhi ,in Suntech five years, later took charge of vice President of United States company, respo
nsible for American business development, lightning left in July this year.
Zhang Yi, Suntech's CFO, left this year.
As for the middle and operation workers, the loss situation is even more serious, that also creates various co
ntradictions though not obvious between Suntech and other enterprises, but has always been there.
Just as the two sides of a coin, the turnover of Suntech's employees are not all come from the soliciting outside.
Shi Zhengrong and the CEO of Trina Solar Gao Jifan both praise the internatio
nalized route, they will often emphasize Suntech or Trina Solar is not o
nly a Chinese company, but should be viewed as an internatio
nal company (as it does so, the Chinese listed enterprise, the Chinese photovoltaic equity accounts for o
nly of the part, and a small; and to be Australian). They all are addicted to make a internatio
nal team, so in Trina Solar and Suntech everywher
e foreign staff as a management and foreign affairs work.
Shi Zhengrong and Gao Jifan artificial that China's photovoltaic industry every policy implementation and accomplishments adjustment, let the Chinese government attaches im
portance to photovoltaic industry for energy co
nservation and emission reduction successfully, China photovoltaic development plan from scratch, up until now the 50GW development goal by 2020.They lobbyed time after time, and invited the government official to visit factory to prove photovoltaic is clean and can help China of industry transformation of new industries. China's photovoltaic industry can start this year; Si and Gao are the biggest heroes.
But the market attitude of Suntech and Trina Solar can be summarized as "attention but not concentrated", their attention on domestic market is much less than overseas market, to market, both of them are tend to go upper line: making good relations with the government, so when there came good policies they could get benefit.
But if want to open internatio
nal market further, Shi need a much more internatio
nal team. In the Reuters website's Suntech executives list, CFO David comes from America's BECHTEL company, his last job is in Tetratech company; John Lefebvre took charge of the President of the United States company on September 26, o
nce worked in SolarCity and GE; CBO Andrew Beebe, graduated from the United States, one of the most famous ivy university Dartmouth. The rest executives except Xie Xiaona have Wuxi government background, all come from the internatio
nal famous companies and the university of new south wales.
A large number of airborne troops brought let Suntech unimpeded in internatio
nal market, but it has also brought new problems: how to old employees and "airborne" between even-keeled? Shi said: "I will employ Chinese people as I can, but Suntech is facing the customers in European and American market, not China's coal mining area." When he was looking forward to making Suntech internationalization, he seemed to ignore these "coal mine workers" holds the Suntech's scientific research, financial, customers and government relations in every aspect. When understand China, know Chinese management model of "coal mine workers" leaves his post, Suntech's system, concept, easily formed in co
nvey middle vacuum. There is something can be reference, and Suntech this year awarded to laboratory manager equipment Liu Huailin 1 million yuan award, explain he progress of science and technology to the attention, but there's a detail: in order to ensure that the company Liu Huailin product safety, the house was mortgaged to the bank obtain 800,000 yuan loans, research and development work after was able to carry on. To research and development co
ncentration of Shi, why did Liu Huailin not declare the scientific research funds?
Before "dro
pped forces" is "air force", how to adjust to the mind now become "army", whether have so deep feelings to Suntech is unknown, the senior staff Suntech employed from BP, Siemens, PWC, and other enterprises with fat salary between 2006 and 2007 had already left more than half.
That embodies the co
ntradictory mentality of Shi, on one hand, he hopes Suntech always maintain the explosive type growth, on the other hand also hope the old employees will be able to keep up with his internatio
nal process, but even Shi himself will make mistakes in management, this problem is not unique to Suntech, but industry development too fast, from dozens of small factory of MW to China's richest man, then to the financial crisis and the 2010 outbreak of the market, and we all didn't realize that serious industry downs, photovoltaic industry trap and opportunities both existed. Senior analyst Doctor Lian Rui from professio
nal analysis said:"The uncertainty of this industry is too big, so everyone should understand us for the deviation of the prediction."Shi also realized the problem, he said to media that he is hunting for a CEO, but this is easier said than done?
Uncompromising Leader
Shi's complex of "boss" has been accepted in the industry, of course, that along the way, o
nly Suntech has the qualification. But he failed to be such a role as godfather, but more like the eldest son Sani who has perso
nality hot and loves the family.
In the difficult process of Suntech going public, state-owned enterprises background overweight listed a big obstacle, for this Shi co
nflicted with former chairman Li Yanren, finally with the help of Wuxi Government, original shareholders just as LittleSwan dro
pped out, Li Yanren left, industrial in Wuxi had a bit criticism to this. Though I am not the parties, and have no comment a
bout this, but think over when calm down, if not, could that Suntech become this Suntech today?
Shi Zhengrong warned that the industry will be surplus when it developed fast, most people think he just wanted to scare the competition and no one effusive; At the time that Yingli gave the super-low price of 0,69 yuan, Shi taunted it several times at the meeting before thousands of people, although it is hard to address, and it is said the price just for Proprietary Power, whether the error occurs also needs to be //con
firm/i/ied, but to the identity of Shi, these words just off his bearing.
From years of observation, Shi's character can be summed up as: a straightforward and some reckless, uncompromising idealist.
It is such a character, but also to Shi Zhengrong it has been calling for industry self-regulation, but it should be a handful. He admits: "We must avoid a concept: If the oppo
nents are to death I can live better. This idea is naive, you can not put someone to death now, and the industry has been new entrants come in, my recommendations are: We should ratio
nal analysis of industry trends and their competitive advantage. "This should serve as industry arbiter of Suntech, but often dissatisfied with things to see taking up arms after the run ahead, allowing him to four enemies. This succession of industry circulating, such a thing: Shi had intended to elect a new post Energy Association, but it was called the Australian, non-compliance, and finally blocked.
Shi was also seen as the industry's most famous poison one of the to
ngue and the reason is that: he often said some including market pessimistic expectations and in some of the criticism of the phenomenon, he called that he often announces some immature prophecy. But unfortunately, all these years of history has proved that most of his words are right.
“Photovoltaic industry has bubbles, one is the wealth effect, and the second is the place to stoke the government."All these were put forward in 2007, no one believed.
“No market, how to have the factory!" The local government will question to photovoltaic industry as an im
portant industry.
"Thin film solar is absolutely bubble; we should analysis who hypes film concept? Are there industry leaders and industry experts?" In 2009 when the film made Shi said film factory anger.
"No matter what industry, as long as the Chinese participate into, the production immediately goes up. If not pay attention to brand and business model construction, finally o
nly 'people drink soup, foreigners eating meat'." 2009’s forecast, it is realized now, now and even in the future, the l
ink will maintain at extremely low profit margins.
"The European demand falls," next year, global market will sure photovoltaic surplus." All these words were published in November 2010.
"PV industry still is unformed; you may be someone in the world today, but may be nothing tomorrow."
"The next two years will be sad," we have to get through the winter in two years. "Next year he is expected the solar panels inventory level will be up to 11 GW.
He also has many words that can cause the reso
nance of the language. Such as "bold" forecast 2011 China market will have 1.5 GW of capacity, "but he also said that I never expected it'd reached 3 GW; Forecast the electricity price is to a dollar per kilowatt hour, and now has become a reality. It has not been validation is he said 2015 China certainly is the world's largest market, the year capacity is 8 GW-10 GW, American has 6 GW or so, and China, U.S. and India will be the biggest photovoltaic markets.
He will say something everyone in the industry say how to spend the crisis, avoid malicious competition, establish industry system, the more he will say some people won't say, such as for domestic policy before was slowly down, some officials and government departments for not, some are lacking in initiative and overcautious enterprises compared the old total, he's a really different number.
As a media person, a bystander, the China brand of Suntech before a few years, the brand marketing can say not be very successful, the excessive apotheosis of Shi makes people dislike this story. People will feel all the apotheosis will unrealistic, compared the commercial unusual talent, we even takes Shi Zhengrong as a technology rich hero. Shi is one businessman who have the idealism color and take the solar industry as own responsibility, and he spares no effort for developing solar industry. (He made great effort for mass media PV-tech application, and did a great contribution), He admitted that he is also confusing, making mistakes, but why packaging himself as a perfect man?
After Yingli become the spo
nsor of World Cup, Suntech is also the spo
nsors of Zhufeng and other sports’ brands. Suntech doesn’t see Yingli havin
g a good future. What is more, some writers will see Yingli’s "heroic victory" as a "hollowing out", let a person dumbfounded, although the words are not come from the will of Shi, but it further corrupts Suntech's image, this makes Yingli more implicative, just in the article of a counter that let readers compare the good or bad by itself, so said these words for the reasons that the information of Shi Zhengrong is easy to collect, but can get the detailed information from the low-key Yingling CEO, Miao Liansheng, just the internal perso
nnel can get it.
This case after Zhang Jianmin was appointed for media relations manager become more improved, now of Suntech, is in a more generous eyes to look at interbank event, friction, meanwhile, Suntech also won more respect for the company.
Face to Face with Wrong
At the end of September, the 10 anniversary celebration ceremony of Suntech held, the energetic Shi Zhengrong feel some tired. Structure adjustment, strategic layout and a lot of negative news let him has no time to rest enough. He said: "in the last 10 years we have many auras, a lot of brilliant, because we are the boss, we also pay a lot for the boss’s price, and we also do a lot of exploration, there are success or the failures, for the follows, for the second, the third provides a lot of experience for reference. At the same time we also got a lot of questions, you are the big boss, you should do very well. We sometimes don't necessarily do very well, so the media friends forgive my indulgence." He won the applause, because in the past, there is had never been seen before. To the author's feeling is that he finally from the aura of go out, and given more reflection and summarized. Although his speech often still emphasize Suntech's leadership, but let person have a understanding laugh with bad feeling, if not so, he is not the Shi Zhengrong.
Although Shi admitted to making some mistakes, but some wrong I think cannot be attributed to him, before the news of "cheat donate" event with calm analysis, Suntech's operation if correct still have dubious, but the merchant's investment is always to return, in doing good and pursue maximization benefit when doing good is understandable.
Also let Suntech fell some distressed is terminate the co
ntract with MEMC. All this is the sin of the war. In addition to TRW CEO Gao Jifan in the first half of 2008 is aware with a broken wrist, and give up thousands of millions’ poly project, there are no one fell the financial crisis’s risk. Including Q-cells、CSI and Nanjing CLP enterprises also sign a long co
ntract with polysilicon enterprises. Remove the supply, let Suntech get rid of the shackles of the body in the lo
nger term, when signing the 10 years co
ntract with MEMC supply agreement, also taking the Suntech shares too, this "break up" with each other, on the one hand, it should be MEMC refused to negotiate, on the other hand, Suntech likes to refer the silicon chips parts in order to low down the cost. In 2006 we sign the co
ntract with MEMC; the price of raw materials is cheaper by 20%-30%,but then we see the trend of raw materials in go down, if we put this co
ntract go down, more than 400 million dollars were lost compared the spot price. Because five years ago, we had paid the advance payment 57 million dollars, the other part admitted we pay more than 60 million dollars until the co
ntract ending. Totally we will pay 110 million dollars, and there will be 400 million dollars saved.
Suntech is struggling with a net debt burden of $130 m, the result of its expensive acquisition of wafer producer Rietech Solar in March. Rietech formerly known as Brilliant silicon energy. (wafer provider of Suntech) According to the company planning, total investment in the Rietech Solar plan could hit $1 bn. At present, it will reach a size of 1.23GW of production capacity with mo
nocrystalline and polycrystalline in the first half of 2011, and reach 2.4 GW and 1.2 GW by separately for modules and sections in late 2011, also can say that its own wafer always maintain half of the quantity. Rietech will reach ultimately 3GW of production capacity.
Perso
nally think that Shi actually invest to thin films at fault, After the short-term prospect downturn, he couldn't help developing thin film projects:Have been making thin films all his life, Suntech always what to make a breakthrough, but it accustomed to ‘number one’ be unable to bear technologically backward of father mainstream,from May 2007 to early 2011, Shi waste a great deal of time and resources, the project has eventually abandoned, in havin
g always been a study films, as a scientist and a successful businessman who still loves be called Doctor more co
nvincing to be absolutely unbelievable if that the project's viability can’t be analyzed, this Idealists still carrying the torch for his old occupations, even it still carry some risk. he endanger himself by going to get a gamble as much as possible, “I have been more than fifty years old, What do I dream” as a explorer, Shi said, for avoid unnecessary mistakes and complications for newly-comers, Suntech have still courage to admit their mistakes.
Chinese companies will have to spend some time practicing this and puts the emphasis on the research and development uses 5%-8% of sales incomes, as a result, after five years it appears again probably First Solar who has been approved by the market, while today PV market bear strong survival pressure. iI rest space for research have become smaller and smaller, like First Solar made a sensatio
nal product after be drowned themselves in the studies over the last 10 years, nothing can be replicate.
Medias compare often Shi with Yingli CEO Miao Liansheng who is in great co
ntrast to former, it represents the co
nflict between different thought of Chinese and foreign enterprises. a
bout smooth out the financial crisis, what is most distressing is how predictable all of this was, and how against the market crisis, Miao is by force very more than Shi.
The most difficult moment of the company that is in pio
neering initial stage in faces to creditor went to him for the debt, Employees leave the company in succession, Miao was to see him being humiliated and bullied .While early Miao joined the Army, after leaving the army, he worked in at least six to seven types of jobs.
After more than twenty years training, ups and downs, from time to time, understanding a
bout essential risk and market gave him to not be a second option, among the executives who in high class position in Yingli from the beginning of entrepreneurship, many still eat anything but carrot, as the old Yingli made a living by selling vegetables before a decade, part of their pay is taken out in these carrot for several months, Shi’s enviro
nment for entrepreneurship with o
nly be described as paradise! ‘Technology heroes’, ‘quoted companies’, ‘the richest man in China’, etc, build such shrines round Shi within minutes of these titles, as a normal, he needs time to digest and accumulate.
The former vertically integrated model can be proud have already been generally adopted by the industry, in fact, Yingli tends more or less to make too much of its own problems, because pandas plans costs high, the principal attacking Fine silicon industry with glide as a result of Polycrystalline prices situation quickness but the co
nsciousness a
bout crises make no exceptions so he can always avoid huge, damaging losses without biting into muscle and bone.
Trina Solar could then looking a lot like Suntech’s models, Gao Jifan and Shi all embrace business goals: to create internatio
nal brand decoration company! They also frowned on being referred to as ‘China company ’,but from Trina's operation does not seem to have big mistakes, and cost co
ntrol might be better, so the internatio
nalization route is being proved to be correct by practice to China. The cautious and cost co
ntrol of Gao are the main reason.
With a strategic vision, not o
nly does Shi give Suntech fame as a mirage, but bring numerous tangible benefits, then Shi overcoming objections to create GSF(Global Sola Fund), This investment has surpassed US$ 200 million for Suntech while the first quarter of 2010, As the Maoist Idealists ,for the right and wrong merit of Shi Zhengrong there are much more enormous co
ntroversy than any enterprise inside the industry, Like Chair Mao, he opened a new epoch to allow PV industry to flourish, and give sense to some people such as Li Yuanchao in im
portant jobs at natio
nal governments on PV, the industry have no official support in the expected to end; As Chair Mao, He lacked the pragmatism to follow-up construction, try to channel all energy into the world with the lack of details; now as Chair Mao hi also is stepping down altar, this is a good thing for him and Suntech.
Scenarios of non responsibility: Could Suntech be bought up?
South Korea ba
sed LG and Suntech have announced at the same time, deny the rumor that LG will buy Suntech, in fact, There were a huge number of press reports a
bout such this case back to 2009, later that can be killed by the true, However, Now Shi is calmer than the previous special edition when respond these rumors include bankruptcy of Suntech. Image with non responsibility, which companies you supposed if Suntech agreed to a takeover? those would be the first North Korea in Korean currency reform in 17 years/Priority co
ndition is that they would have industrial technology basis and understand The companies within the industry can be targeted in the shooting, so they would be polysilicon manufactures most probably /One way to do this is to just target a subset of those with the disease/We use the term bandwidth to represent such a frequency range
Believe that build the perfect industry chain after purchase with Suntech, then it will become more powerful. it seem those companies most likely to meet these criteria such as GCL OCI、REC、Hemlock and Wacker, etc. as Hemlock and Wacker do not appeared co
ntent with the status of PV industry at the moment, it thereby rest the former three most possibly, but perso
nally think that Shi burnt never his own painstaking effort, just as those huge enterprises within the industry faced challenges after their time in the limelight so does the boss of Solarfun Power, Lu Yo
nghua which heart sank and turned cold with death of Wang Hanhua, how do others say goodbye to Tens of billions of assets they made themselves and more attractive prospects?
Others whispered that the negative news of Suntech were expanded specifically, also be deliberately speculation by the buyers want to acquire Suntech, how fact, be not yet known.
Should buy a few stocks?
In Suntech’s 10th Anniversary Celebrations, “Should buy more stocks of Suntech,” half-joking, said Li Junfeng, Director of the Energy Research institute of the Natio
nal Development and Reform Commission, because the shares of some PV manufacturers fell at the lowest point includes Suntech, the value of theirs equipments and Plant alo
nes were trading well over share prices at the moment.
No mention has been made of brand and channel of building by Li, as it should be noted these values with the accountability, Even if now without a watts of production capacity, o
nly looks for OEM as an acting labour to produce, the business would little by little wind. Believe several major manufacturers’ stocks as Suntech back to the sales for many investors rather moved, in the long term, as a nuts that does not exist in these giants to survive in the father competition, they are o
nly alive, would also be great developing in industry, our all PV players make never doubt of, if o
nly we want o
nly pick a bottom as possible or maybe “return a salute”.
Nobody gave Shi any money; he is a self-made millionaire, from listed in public to expand production, then has been lumpy for a bunch of reasons within the industry, Suntech has a capacity of 6MW of modules a day, that would have similar results in full financial year of 2003, Shi Zhengrong and his Suntech have already become a legend no matter what is going to happen on the road to the future.
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